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paper focuses on the crisis that began in the summer 2007 in U.S. when increased delinquency on the secondary 
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effects that are transmitted to all market segments, by involving the real sector. Under its global effect, this crisis 
was characterized as comprehensive, complex and global. This paper intends to detect the origin of this crisis and 
to analyze the potential government mistakes that led to the current world economic state. 
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Introduction 
 
According to the Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) for determining the 
U.S. dates of business cycles, the top of the economic activity in the U.S. was reached in December 2007. 
The peak signifies a turning point, when the expansion (in the United States that lasted from November 
2001 to December 2007, i.e. 73 months) goes into recession. The official date for the start of the recession 
in the U.S. is set to be December 2007. When the United States face a recession, almost no country can 
remain immune to the economic turmoil in the world's most powerful force, so folk said: "When America 
sneezes, the whole world gets the flu". 
The reasons for the occurrence of the worst crisis of 21st century are numerous, among which the most 
important are: imbalances in the global economy; non-monetary financial institutions and their 
"innovative" financial instruments; credit expansion and balloons economies; non-transparency and 
corruption scandals; weaknesses in the regulation and deregulation; investors impossibility to make the 
optimal choice in continuity. 
The crisis of the 21st century or "Great Recession" arose as a consequence of the collapse of the 
housing market in the U.S. (real estate bubble) followed by a long period of rapid growth in construction 
and real estate prices. The financial markets participants were too long surrounded with macroeconomic 
environment followed by high growth of global production, low inflation and very low interest rates 
(Jurgen Stark, 2008). Expansionary U.S. monetary policy (Alan Greenspan move to reduce the interest 
rates in order to help surpass the recession and provide prosperity), Japan and a small degree of countries 
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in the Eurozone led to the emergence of global excess liquidity. In the context of research into the causes 
of the global economic crisis, one should bear in mind the fact that recent years have seen changes in the 
relative power between different regions and countries. Some Asian countries (China and India) realized 
exceptionally high rates of economic growth in the last decade. National savings rate in China exceeded 50 
% of GDP and result in real investment boom. The growth of export power increase its foreign reserves 
2000 billion USD (China is declared for a country with the largest export in 2009 who was in excess of 1.2 
trillion, before Germany 1.12 trillion U.S. dollars). Balance of payment surpluses among highly developed 
countries were present in Germany and Japan. Contrary to this, U.S. and UK have created deficits and low 
savings rates nationwide for years. Moreover, in the last 20 years, many countries modernized their 
financial systems and created new channels that linked savings and investment (Petkovski, 2009).  
Accordingly, the normal assumption is excess liquidity spillover from countries with great wealth, in 
the form of various types of investments in the U.S., UK and other highly developed countries. That 
happened. The huge influx of capital into the U.S., kept interest rates at a low level (Fiti, 2009: 257). 
Seductive and attractive financial instruments, available through securitization, increased appetite of 
investors and opened the possibility for heating the financial markets and real estate markets. Nobel 
laureate Stieglitz says: " ... due to the fact that many people in Europe believed that U.S. banks are good, 
and the regulation strong, managed even half of the repacked bad "toxic" loans to be re-exported to other 
countries (Stieglitz, 2008). 
The origin of the financial crisis 
 
Financial innovation were mainly manifested by extremely high expansion of instruments for the 
transfer of credit risk which enabled transfer, hedging and active trading with the credit risk as a special 
type of funds. Emergence, development and diversification of the various types of non-monetary financial 
instruments (mainly formed by the banks themselves) are considered the primary generators of the current 
global financial and economic crisis. The versatility of these instruments is mainly due to the formation of 
many non-monetary financial institutions - despite pension funds and investment trusts - the so-called 
private equity funds (who invest in risky capital in entrepreneurial firms in their higher developmental 
stages), then the so-called sovereign wealth funds (funds through which countries with high surpluses in 
the balance of payments, that in a significant proportion of revenues derived from oil - Russia , Norway , 
China - invest in the securities of the largest world companies), hedge funds (highly speculative funds), 
banks in shadow and others.  
The structure of the U.S. financial system had drastic changes in the last 10-15 years in terms of 
reducing the traditional banking activities in account for the increased aggressive activities of investment 
banks, shadow banks and others. The combined balance of the biggest investment banks in the U.S. is 4 
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trillion (these are not subject to supervision by the central bank), which approaches the value of the 
balance of the five biggest traditional banks which is 6 trillion (Krugman, 2009).  
What is interesting in this situation is how these shadow banks or so-called shadow banking 
system and how they form their innovative financial products? Banks today, as a consequence of the 
imposed restrictions on the maturity of deposits, are forced to think of other ways to increase their 
liquidity, which began to securitize their loans or turning them into securities - for example, to issue long-
term securities based on subprime mortgages. In the U.S. the securitization of these loans is registered as 
off-balance transactions, which mean records outside of regular bank accounts. How is this achieved? 
Banks create special financial institutions (entities) or shadow banks (eg, Special Purpose Vehicles - SPVs, 
further Structured Investment Vehicles-SIVs, etc.) and transmit their own portfolio loans or securities 
issued based on their loans. In this way, by removing their own loans from balance sheets, banks have tried 
to transfer the risk of these loans to the shadow banks that have been established by themselves and which 
are not subject to the supervision of the regulatory authorities. The financial crisis has shown that such 
bank activities present most damage to themselves. Newly established shadow banks created their assets 
through the issuance of short-term securities, which, however, were generally bought by banks founders of 
these institutions (Fiti, 2009: 260).  
The bank that approved the residential mortgage loan (originator) transfers the loan to the shadow 
bank (issuer) which issues securities so-called MBS (mortgage-backed securities) based on that loan 
broadcast, and then sold them to interested investors. The interest rate that shadow bank gets by the debtor 
is used to pay off the mortgage investor - one who bought the MBS security. The same applies to the 
principal debt. Furthermore, based on the MBS paper is issued a new security so-called CMO 
(Collateralized Mortgage Obligations). In this type of security the issue is about "another additional 
layer between the final and ultimate debtor and creditor or depositor". Namely, the classification is as 
following: class A (worns lowest interest), class Z (which carries the greatest interest) until to the class R 
(paper holder who gets what's left - a lot or nothing). The subordination of classes is not by the level of 
credit risk, but the degree of priority in repayment. The securitization of these securities was conducted in 
accordance with the standards of public agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were supposed to 
stimulate the housing market in the U.S. and were subject to state bail out. However, in the U.S. there were 
also mortgage loans that were not under the "state cap" (guarantee). These were securities with poor 
solvency and high risk, known as the so-called subprime mortgages, such as subprime loans who were 
approved for the purchase of cars, student loans, holders of credit cards (so-called ABS-assets-backed 
securities). In the entire portfolio of financial derivatives can be inserted and many other types of 
securities - the so-called structured, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which are issued on 
the basis of ABS securities. Through this whole process, we can understand the complexity of the 
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relationship mortgage debtor and final savers, awareness of the existence of numerous other financial 
institutions among them, not just the bank, which allows for the formation of a huge increase in debt and 
requirements, but also an enormous risk to the participants in these transactions. Soaring real estate prices 
over fair value, shooting bubbles and the dramatic collapse of important financial institutions, is just a 
consequence of the complex causal relationship. However, with the collapse of a major financial 
corporation or bank, such as Lehman brother and Bear Sterns who wore "honest" epithet TITF (Too-
important-to-fail), the first culprit to whom all attention is focused is the regulation.  
There are two reasons for the severity of the current recession:  
First, according to the IMF, the recession created by the spray in financial bubbles is sharper and 
last longer than recessions caused by other reasons (for example, the shocks on the supply side). The likely 
reason is that the pre-crisis growth is based on the illusion of growth and income is more artificial.  
Second, synchronized crises (in which several major economies are also affected) are harder to 
solve. No country can rely on others to get out of the recession by increasing demand for its exports. The 
current crisis was caused by financial factors, and in the same time synchronized (Rodrik, 2009). 
Chronological time of crisis and corporate scandals can be seen in Table 1. 
LOCATION WHERE THE TABLE SHOULD BE PLACED 
 
Monetary policy measures 
The first defensive line in terms of the financial crisis and weak economy is the interest rate policy of 
the independent Fed. By increasing or decreasing the quantum of reserves offered by the banking system, 
the Fed will be able to reduce or increase the federal interest rate, which in fact is the interest rate at which 
banks lend to each other. With the launch of 2007 crisis, major central banks aggressively relax monetary 
policies, which led to a decline in the reference interest rates. Key Fed interest rate was cut off at 5.25 % in 
September 2007, December 2008 it was 0 % and maintained the trend of 0-1/4 % in 2009.  
However, lending was still frozen and the conditions for taking loans soured considerably, which meant 
a drastic increase in the cost of lending to households and firms or well known condition of "liquidity 
trap". The null interest rates do not mean that central banks do not have extra "ammunition" to fight 
deflation and recession. They are almost engaged in so-called "quantitative easing" monetary policy, 
meaning an increase of reserve money to purchase financial instruments or increasing their assets by 
increasing their monetary assets. 
The profitability of the banking sector, measured by the ratio of return on capital in the U.S. continued 
to be low during the second half of 2009. Increased credit losses continue to be the biggest factor limiting 
the gains of banks. In 2009, bank holding companies broadcast a significant amount of equity. A big issue 
appeared during the decision results of the program to supervise capital outlook (Supervisory Capital 
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Assessment Program-SCAP), which indicated that some companies have a need to increase or improve the 
quality of their capital. According to this program, in the near future Fed must perform supervision of 
firms with 5000 companies with capital less than 50 billion $ in assets in order to realize the need to 
increase their capital as a result of losses in residential and commercial loans in that period.  
In fact, some of the measures of central banks to stabilize the financial system, taking place on a global 
level were: expansion of deposit insurance, injecting public capital into banks, guaranteeing debt emissions 
by the banks and increased access to funding from central banks. This strong and amazing response - 
which is a sharp contrast to the failure of international coordination that made a terrible depression of 1930 
- proved very effective. The major central banks globally coordinated interest rate cut of 50 basis points in 
October 2008 in an effort to increase liquidity and restore confidence through demounting that are 
determined to act aggressively in order to increase the liquidity of the financial sector. The interest rates 
remained constant until December 2008 in the U.S. and Japan, and until spring 2009 in the eurozone and 
UK. Some large manufacturers and small advanced countries with strong growth began to conduct 
monetary adjustment. Australia, Israel and Norway have raised interest rates. Also, authorities in China 
and India has raised key interest rates by the end of 2009, but it made administrative changes to tighten 
lending in order to reduce the expansion of loans, because of signs of rapid growth of economies.  
In efforts to stabilize the financial system and their traditional role of creditor in the last resort, the Fed 
has developed innovative programs to ensure the well-collateralised short-term credit to the financial 
system. In the absence of these loans, many healthy financial instiotucii would have been forced to sell 
their assets, exerting downward pressure on prices, or driven to failure, which greatly would stimulate the 
crisis. 
Conclusion   
This article is intended to detect the reasons for the appearance of the financial crises and the responds 
that were taken by the monetary government to facilitate the economic situation. One question pops up 
here. How could regulators have such flaws in the regulatory system and allowed giants such high 
connectivity in the financial system and leading position in the financial markets to fail? The answer lies in 
the inadequate and poor regulation or similar to the so-called regulatory forbearance*. The regulation 
does not do anything to stop the growth of multiple bubbles and to suppress excessive influx of investor 
optimism and spirit, that although short term wore nice profit, however on the long-term danger of wearing 
a big disaster.  
                                                 
 
*Regulatory forbearance it is not about supervisory incompetence but, rather, the potential for a fully briefed regulator to decide 
not to intervene 
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In many cases the authorities were actually happy about the rise in prices of real estate and financial 
instruments and have done nothing to slow these trends, interpreting them as a sign of strength and 
dynamism of their economies. For example, U.S. economist Alan Blinder suggests that in the U.S., all 
previous initiatives for stricter regulation of financial derivatives were rejected or a significant portion of 
the mortgage loans were created out of the banking system, i.e. they were not subject to any regulation 
(Blinder, 2009).  
 But failure can not be attributed only to state regulators. The entire system of corporate governance and 
oversight collapsed. It includes, despite regulators, shareholders, creditors, accounting systems, credit 
rating agencies, etc. Most people, including informed insiders simply "forgot" the systemic risk that 
financial institutions have embraced.  
However, what is most important is that the world economy still seen rapid recovery from the global 
crisis and immediately return to positive growth rates with positive projections for the coming years. What 
moved the economy in a positive direction? The answer lies in coordination and implementation of 
aggressive measures taken by governments in the U.S. and other countries. 
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TABLE I. STAGES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
First stage                
 The crisis of "Subprime" 
mortgage markets has grown 
in the Credit Crunch 
Second stage  
Investment banks have felt 
the impact 
Third stage  
Governments are Involved 
Fourth stage  
Volatility returns 
August 2007 30 August 2007 7 September 2008 4 January 2009 
BNP Paribas writes off 
receivables from three 
investment funds blaming the 
lack of liquidity in certain 
segments of markets for 
securitized securities in the 
United States; initiating a 
mass withdrawal of liquidity 
from the markets "asset 
backed securities" 
UBS announces USD 690 
million loss for Q3 
FED buys debt from Fannie 
and Freddie worth USD 
12,000 billion after its shares 
collapsed 
The German government 
with the injection of EUR 10 
billion in Commerzbank 
receives a quarter of Bank 
10 August 2007 24 October 2007 14 September 2008 14 January 2009 
Fed injected 42 billion USD, 
ECB 156 billion EUR, the 
Bank of Japan 1000 billion 
JPY 
Merrill Lynch announces 
losses of USD 8.4 billion as 
a result of the crisis of the 
"Subprime" mortgage 
markets 
Bank of America buys 
Merrill Lynch 
Deutche Bank announces 
EUR 3.9 billion loss 
14 September 2007 14 March 2008 15 September 2008 15 January 2009 
Bank of England saved 
Northern Rock with a short-
term loan, initiating bank 
panic 
US Fed and JPMorgan 
Chase announced an 
agreement for financing of 
Bear Stearns 
Lehman Bros bankruptcy 
Anglo-Irish Bank was 
nationalized 
17 February 2008 16 March 2008 17 September 2008 16 January 2009 
Northern Rock is nationalized 
JPMorgan Chase buys Bear 
Stearns  
FED saves AIG with 85 
billion USD 
Bank of America announces 
USD 2.4 billion losses while 
the government U.S. agrees 
to USD 20 billion capital 
injections and guarantees 
USD 118 billion in losses. 
Citygroup announces USD 
8.3 billion loss and 
announces that the company 
will be split into two 
    25 September 2008   
    
Hank Paulson proposes 
rescue plan  worth USD 700 
billion   
    6 October 2008   
    
FED announces plan of USD 
900 billion available to 
banks in the form of short-
term loans   
    8 October 2008   
    
UK Government announces 
that it will save the banks 
and makes GBP 200 billion 
available to banks through 
special liquidity schemes 
GBP 50 billion to clean the 
balance sheets of banks and 
GBP 250 billion guarantee 
for refinancing   
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Source: Financial Times, January 17/18, pp. 2-3 
 
